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TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTION FOR w ORTHLESS STOCK-OBJECTIVE v. SUBJECTIVE TEsTS-The taxpayer held stock in a corporation which had been in receivership for five years, and which had, during all of that
time, liabilities substantially exceeding its assets. When the receivership was ended
and when a derivative suit against the management was compromised, the taxpayer declared the stock to be worthless and claimed a deduction for 1937. The
commissioner denied the deduction on the ground that the stock had not become
worthless in 1937. The Tax Court sustained this ruling and the circuit court
of appeals affirmed. Held, the value of the stock should be determined by an
objective test based on "identifiable events" rather than by the subjective test
based on the taxpayer's reasonable and honest belief supported by. his conduct,
and the finding on this question of fact by the Tax Court should be conclusive.
The decision of the lower court affirmed. Lillian Boehm v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1945) 66 S.Ct. 120.
Under the Revenue Act of 1936 a deduction for worthless stock under section 23 ( e) was allowed "for losses sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." 1 The Regulations in force required
that losses "must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions fixed by
identifiable events, bona fide and actually sustained during the taxable period for
which allowed." 2 In the absence of a definite statutory rule the worthlessness
of stock is a question of fact and the factual elements of each case taken as a
whole are determinative of the time at which loss occurred.8 In such cases the
taxpayer has the burden of proof which he must sustain not only by showing that
the commissioner was wrong but by demonstrating that the deduction was taken
in the proper year. 4 The kind of evidence to sustain such a burden of proof is
of prime importance. Here_it was proved that the corporation had suffered large
operating losses for two years which resulted in the appointment of a receiver in
1932. The receiver's reports showed that in 1934 the liabilities of $707,403.67
exceeded the cash assets of $39,000, that a similar condition existed in 1935
when a distribution of 4 per cent was made to creditors and that in 1937, at the
time of the final report, there was only a small amount of cash on hand. In
1932 a $500,000 shareholders' suit was started against the board of directors
for mismanagement which was not settled until 1937 with a compromise of

49 Stat. L. 1648 at 1659 (1936), 26 U.S.C. (1940) § 23 e.
TREAS. REG. 94, art. 23 (e) 1, under Revenue Act of 1936.
8 Volker v. United States, (D.C. Mo. 1929) 40 F. (2d) 697.
4 Jones v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 103 F. (2d)
681; Nicholson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 8th, 1937) 90 F. (2d)
978; Munson v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) l00 F. (2d) 363; Mahler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 869.
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$50,000. There is no evidence that this suit was considered an asset of the corporat~on. The taxpayer's c~ntention, oyerruled both by the Tax Court 5 and by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 6 was that the question was
not whether the stock had any actual value but whether the taxpayer honestly
believed that it had some value until the litigation was terminated. Precedent
for this view is to be found in one of the two conflicting sets of cases in the lower
federal courts. This line of 'authority relies on the subjective test as a proper
standard of determining value. It proceeds on the assumption that, since there
is no definite test prescribed, a practical rather than a legal test should be followed. 7 These courts have interpreted this to mean that the view of the taxpayer, as evidenced by his actions, should be controlling. In a recent case, valuation was made to depend on the taxpayer's appraisal of the corporation's possibilities of future successful operation and the possible recoupment of his investment. 8 This case in turn relied on others which held that a suspension of business 9 and an advance of funds by a person willing to pay company debts 10 were
not ,"identifiable events" because the shareholder believed there was a "prospect
of .•. survival." 11 The other line of cases and the one relied upon by the Court
in the principal case looks to the language of the statute and to the Regulations
to find an objective standard determined by the words "identifiable event." But
in the interpretation of these two words, fine distinctions must be drawn. · Fluctuations in value,12 a deficit,1 3 operation at a loss,1 4 inflated book values,1 5 receivership,16 sale for a nominal price,1 7 pending litigation with possible insolvency,1 8
a petition in bankruptcy,19 or reorganization 20 are not in themselves determinative of value. The true test is the excess of liabilities over assets when they have
T.C. Memo. Op. Doc. I I 1621, October 23, 1943.
(C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 146 F. (2d) 553•
7 Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445,· 50 S. Ct. 202 (1930).
8 Smith v. Helvering, (C.C.A. D.C. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 529.
9 Benjamin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 70 F.
(2d) 719.
.
10 Rassieur v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 129 F.
(2d) 820.
11 Id. at 825-6.
12 Brown v. Commissioner of Internal ~evenue, (C.C.A. ?th, 1938) 94 F. (2d)
5

6

IOI.
13 Union C. DeFord v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 19 B.T.A. 339
(1930).
14 Royal Packing Co. v. Lucas, (C.C.A. 9th, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 180.
15 Henning Bruhn, II B.T.A. 809 (1928).
16 Gowen v. Commissioner of Internal 'Revenue, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 65 F.
(2d) 923, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 687, 54 S. Ct. 123 (1933). Edward C. Lawson v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42 B.T.A. 1103 (1940).
17 Frank C. Rand v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 40 B.T.A. 233 (1939),
affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 116 F. (2d) 929, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 594, 61 S. Ct.
1120 (1941).
'
18 E. J. McMillan, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Doc. 97724, March 28, 1940.
19 Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 T.C.
140 (1944).
29 Jeffrey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 62 F. (2d)
661.
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been properly valued. 21 Thus, a prudent businessman is presumed capable of
analyzing a company's balance sheet, and, after careful reflection upon the financial condition evidenced by it, of determining whether the company is a going
concern. This has been termed the "reasonable hope and expectation" test. 22
In the principal case there would have been no possibility of the company's paying off the creditors and leaving a surplus for the shareholders even if the shareholders' suit had been included as an asset and the amount of the damages
claimed therein had been fully recovered. This was apparent in 1934 but became certain in 1935. Where it is certain that a company is in a very depressed
condition there is no need to wait until the receivership or until the liquidation
is completed. 28 The principal case sustains the second line of authorities on the
ground that it is the more practical from an administrative point of view. The
standard is flexible and, although the taxpayer's attitude and conduct are not
ignored, they are not made paramount. However, the taxpayer using even the
objective standard upheld here is in a perilous position because he cannot take
a partial deduction as in the case of bad debts 24 and because he must, when confronted by several identifiable events, properly time the deduction or possibly risk
the loss of the deduction benefit because of time limitations on filing amended
returns or claiming refunds.25 He may well be guided by Judge Augustus N.
Hand's suggestion: "In cases like this the taxpayer is at times in a very difficult
position in determining in what year to claim a loss. The only safe practice, we
think, is to claim a loss for the earliest year when it may possibly be allowed and
to renew the. claim in subsequent years if there is any reasonable chance of it
being applicable to the income in those years." 26 Also, he may be guided by the
rule that the stock must have some value at the beginning of the year .for which
a deduction is claimed.27 Uniformity of approach and result becomes possible
to the extent that cases are heard by the Tax Court whose decision on this question was here held to be conclusive under the rule of the Dobson case.28 The
Court in adopting the so-called objective approach is attempting in lieu of a statutory definition of value to prescribe a criterion of evidentiary facts which,
although less tenuous than the beliefs of the taxpayer, is, nevertheless, difficult
of application. The adoption of a statutory remedy, as suggested in this case,29
or of the proposed presumption of worthlessness when the stock is written o:ff,80
21

57 1 •

Forbes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 4th, 1933) 62 F. (2d)

22 Sterling Morton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 38 B.T.A. 1270
(1938), affirmed, (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) u2 F. (2d) 320.
28
In re Harrington, (D.C. Mo. 1924) I F. (2d) 749.
24 5 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §§ 28.65 to 28.69 (1942).
25 Cooley Butler and LaRue Butler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 45
B.T.A. 593 (1941).
26 Young v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 123 F. (2d)
597 at 600.
27
Roosevelt Investment Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 45 B.T.A.
440 (1941).
28
Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239
(1943), rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 231, 64 S. Ct. 495 (1944).
29
Principal case at I 22.
so Lynch, "Losses Resulting from Stock Becoming WorthlrSS-Deductibility under
Federal Income Tax Laws," 8 _FORDHAM L. REv. 199 (1939).
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that is now applicable to banks,81 might remedy a situation which is conD.!sing to
courts and taxpayers alike.
·
R
S
osemary cott

81 TREAS. REG. IOI,

art.

23

e-4.

